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PUNTING ON LOGIC: THE ROBERTS COURT TO
SACK SMALL BUSINESS ONCE AGAIN IN
AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League on June 29,
2009,1 it created a ripple effect throughout the major media organizations.
A Sports Illustrated headline read, “Why American Needle-NFL is most
important case in sports history.”2 The New York Times warned readers,
“Antitrust Case Has Implications Far Beyond N.F.L.”3 ESPN’s home web
page declared, “Antitrust case could be Armageddon.”4 When athletic issues arise, traditional sports outlets are typically the only ones to report the
news. This time, however, articles discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari to American Needle surfaced all over the national
media, including The Wall Street Journal,5 The Washington Post,6 and nonsports related Internet blogs.7
Why has so much ink been spilled over an antitrust lawsuit? The answer to this question lies in the repercussions that will be felt by sports
1. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari Granted].
2. Michael McCann, Why American Needle-NFL is Most Important Case in Sports History, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jan. 12, 2010,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/americanneedlev.nfl/index.html.
3. Ken Belson & Alan Schwarz, Antitrust Case Has Implications Far Beyond N.F.L.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at B13.
4. Lester Munson, Antitrust Case Could Be Armageddon, ESPN.COM, July 17, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=munson_lester&id=4336261.
5. Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall St. J. L. Blog, Threading ‘American Needle’: Could It
Destroy Free Agency in the NFL?, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/12/threading-americanneedle-could-it-destroy-free-agency-in-the-nfl/ (Jan. 12, 2010, 4:12 EST) [hereinafter Threading
American Needle].
6. Drew Brees, The NFL Shouldn’t Call All the Plays, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, at B2.
7. See Posting of Marc Edelman to Above the Law, Sports and the Law: SCOTUS Grants
Cert in American Needle v. NFL,
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/sports_and_the_law_scotus_gran.php (June 30, 2009, 10:00
EST); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Pro Sports and Antitrust: Argument Preview,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/pro-sports-and-antitrust-argument-preview/ (Jan. 12, 2010,
7:32 EST); Posting of Gabriel A. Feldman to The Huffington Post, American Needle and the
NFL’s Single Entity Argument, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/americanneedle-and-the-n_b_409532.html (Jan. 2, 2010, 11:09 EST) [hereinafter The Huffington Post].
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fans, professional athletes, coaches, and small businesses like American
Needle, a hat manufacturer in Illinois.8 Simply put, a ruling in favor of the
National Football League (NFL) in American Needle—that the league is a
single entity rather than thirty-two separate teams—would mean that the
league is completely immune from antitrust laws.9 If the Supreme Court
grants the NFL total immunity from antitrust laws, it would also apply to
the National Hockey League, the National Basketball Association (NBA),
and the Bowl Championship Series.10 The immunity would completely
transform the way professional sports leagues (sports leagues) conduct their
business.11
A decision for the NFL “has the potential to adversely affect fans
through higher prices for merchandise, concessions, parking at stadiums
and even in fees to join fantasy football leagues.”12 The largest implications, however, would be felt on the labor front.13 A victory for the NFL
could spark “a significant shift in the leverage sports leagues have over
players unions . . . giv[ing] the [sports] league[s] latitude to implement a
salary structure of its choosing without fear of antitrust scrutiny and penalties for collusion.”14 Without the ability to challenge sports leagues on antitrust grounds,15 the players’ only option would be to go on strike.16
If the Supreme Court sides with the NFL, many small businesses will
be completely shut out from doing business with the league and “will have
less recourse to sue on antitrust grounds.”17 Without price competition
from small businesses, the NFL will be able to engage in exclusive commercial deals with the highest bidder, such as Nike or Reebok,18 ultimately
forcing small businesses out of the market and driving up prices for fans.
With so much at stake in American Needle—on and off the playing field—
how the Supreme Court rules will reshape the foundation of sports law, resulting in a significant impact on sports fans, leagues, players, and small
businesses.19
8. Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
9. Munson, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. McCann, supra note 2.
12. Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
13. Threading American Needle, supra note 5.
14. Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
15. Brees, supra note 6, at B2.
16. See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
17. Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13; see also Ken Belson, The N.F.L. Is Squeezing Discounters Over Apparel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at B11.
18. See The Huffington Post, supra note 7; Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
19. Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
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This Note examines the role that the Supreme Court’s recent probusiness antitrust jurisprudence under the guidance of Chief Justice John
Roberts will play in determining whether sports leagues can constitute a
single entity in American Needle. Part II provides a general overview of
American Needle and shows how the case made its way to the Supreme
Court. Part III analyzes Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.20
and the creation of the single entity doctrine. Part IV discusses the current
split in the federal circuit courts as to the correct application of Copperweld
to sports leagues and urges the Supreme Court to adopt the majority approach in American Needle. Part V analyzes the current pro-business trend
of the Supreme Court and the role that the justices’ political affiliations
have played in its antitrust jurisprudence under Chief Justice Roberts. Part
VI of this Note will examine the effect that the appointment of Justice
Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court by President Barack Obama may
have on the Supreme Court’s current pro-business antitrust jurisprudence.
Finally, this Note will conclude that despite the fact most commentators
and the majority of circuit courts have rejected single entity treatment for
sports leagues, the Supreme Court’s recent antitrust jurisprudence strongly
points towards a ruling in favor of the NFL in American Needle.
II. BACKGROUND
Currently, a direct conflict exists in the federal circuit courts of appeal
on the issue of whether a sports league should be considered a single entity
for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).21 In
1984, the Supreme Court held in Copperweld that a parent company and its
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each other for
purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1), stating that they act
as a single entity and therefore should be completely immune from antitrust
liability under Section 1.22 However, “what the Supreme Court has never
decided is [whether] Copperweld applies to more complex entities and arrangements that involve a high degree of corporate and economic integration,” such as sports leagues.23 The majority of federal circuit courts have
used Copperweld to hold that sports leagues should not be given single en20. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
21. James A. Keyte, American Needle Reinvigorates the Single-Entity Debate,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split between the
Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of which
have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues”).
22. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
23. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002).
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tity status under Section 1.24 However, the Seventh Circuit in American
Needle, as well as a minority of federal circuit courts, has used Copperweld
to hold that sports leagues should be treated as a single entity for Section 1
purposes.25 Because the Supreme Court did not set clear guidelines in
Copperweld as to when single entity status should be applied,26 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to American Needle27 to resolve the current
federal circuit court split and to clarify whether a professional sports league
should be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1.28
American Needle Inc. is a headwear manufacturer that features the
logos and trademarks of professional sports teams on baseball style hats.29
The NFL is an association, consisting of thirty-two teams, that produces a
season of highly integrated games that culminates in two member teams
playing for the Super Bowl championship.30 For over twenty years,
American Needle was one of many vendors that held a license from the
NFL authorizing it to use each NFL team’s intellectual property to create
headwear bearing the team logos.31 However, in 2000, the NFL decided to
solicit bids from individual vendors for an exclusive license to manufacture
24. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1478c, at
327 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that “the courts have mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald's and Less Like the United Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 238 (2006) (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected
efforts by club-run leagues to be treated as single entities.”); Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 893 n.11 (2008) (“Many
courts have rejected the single-entity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”).
25. Brief for the NFL Respondents at 6, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 164245 [hereinafter Brief for the
NFL] (“The Seventh Circuit has now twice held that a professional sports league can constitute a
single entity even if its member teams are separately owned.”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n and NBA Properties in support of the NFL Respondents’ Response at 4,
petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08661), 2009 WL 164243 [hereinafter Brief for the NBA] (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to
agree with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to
fall outside the scope of Section 1.”).
26. James T. McKeown, 2008 Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: To The
Single Entity And Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 367 (2009) (stating that the “Supreme
Court did not set clear parameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and antitrust defendants have cited Copperweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within the single
entity classification.”).
27. Petition for Certiorari Granted, supra note 1.
28. See McCann, supra note 2.
29. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008).
30. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 1.
31. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 737–38.
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headwear.32 The following year, the NFL refused to renew its headwear
license with American Needle, and instead granted an exclusive headwear
license to Reebok.33 As a result, American Needle brought an antitrust
lawsuit against the NFL, NFL teams, NFL Properties, and Reebok, claiming that the exclusive headwear agreement with Reebok violated Section
1.34 Since each NFL team owns its respective logos and trademarks,
American Needle argued that the teams’ collective agreement to grant the
exclusive license to Reebok was a conspiracy to restrict vendors, such as
American Needle, from acquiring licenses to the NFL team’s intellectual
property.35 The NFL responded by arguing that when licensing a member
team’s intellectual property, the NFL was acting as a single entity pursuant
to Copperweld and was thus immune from Section 1 liability.36 Applying
the Copperweld doctrine—that “single entities cannot restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act”—the district court granted the NFL’s
motion for summary judgment.37 The district court reasoned that, “by
promoting NFL football through collective licensing . . . the NFL teams
‘act[ ] as an economic unit’ in such a manner that ‘they should be deemed .
. . a single entity.’”38
Following the judgment, American Needle appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit claiming that the district court erred in
treating the NFL as a single entity for purposes of Section 1.39 Relying on
its earlier decision in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v.
National Basketball Association,40 the Seventh Circuit started its analysis
by embracing the “possibility that a professional sports league could be
considered a single entity under Copperweld.”41 The court of appeals rejected American Needle’s argument that the exclusive license with Reebok
deprived the market of independent sources of economic power and instead
reasoned “that the NFL teams share[d] a vital economic interest in collectively promoting NFL football. . . . [To] compete[] with other forms of entertainment.”42 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738–39.
Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 739.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.

1996).
41. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 742.
42. Id. at 743.
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decision, declaring that “the NFL teams are best described as a single
source of economic power when promoting NFL football through licensing
the teams’ intellectual property . . . .”43
Although the Seventh Circuit held that the NFL could be considered a
single entity when licensing its intellectual property,44 the question still remained as to whether the NFL should be treated as a single entity with respect to other core ventures.45 The American Needle holding, although in
favor of the NFL, actually added to the confusion regarding Copperweld’s
application to sports leagues by creating a split between the Seventh Circuit
and other circuits such as the First and Ninth, which had denied single entity treatment to sports leagues.46 In an effort to clarify the proper application of Copperweld to sports leagues, the NFL took the unusual step of
supporting American Needle’s request for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.47 This was done to secure a uniform rule recognizing all sports
leagues as single entities.48 Presumably because the federal circuits are in
direct conflict regarding Copperweld’s application to sports leagues, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari against the advice of the United States
Solicitor General.49 By granting the NFL’s request for certiorari,50 the Supreme Court is likely to establish a rule that clarifies how sports leagues are
to be treated under Copperweld.51
III. COPPERWELD AND THE SINGLE ENTITY DOCTRINE
In 1984, the Supreme Court established the single entity doctrine in

43. Id. at 744.
44. Id. (“[T]he NFL teams are best described as a single source of economic power when
promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property . . . .”).
45. See Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that “[t]he NFL Respondents are
taking the unusual step of supporting certiorari in an effort to secure a uniform rule that (i) recognizes the singe-entity nature of highly integrated joint ventures . . . .”).
46. Keyte, supra note 21, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split between the Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of
which have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues . . . .”).
47. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that “[t]he NFL Respondents are taking
the unusual step of supporting certiorari in an effort to secure a uniform rule that (i) recognizes
the singe-entity nature of highly integrated joint ventures . . . .”).
48. Id.
49. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle,
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, (U.S. May 28, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 1497823 [hereinafter
Brief for the U.S.] (“In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.”).
50. Petition for Certiorari Granted, supra note 1.
51. See McCann, supra note 2.
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Copperweld.52 There, the plaintiff alleged that a tubing company and its
parent corporation had conspired in violation of Section 1.53 In the lower
federal courts, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision to hold the parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary liable under Section 1.54 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary were capable of conspiring for purposes of Section 1.55 The Supreme Court started
its analysis by looking at the language and history of the Sherman Act itself.56 Section 1 states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony . . . .57
After reviewing the plain language of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
found that by enacting the statute, Congress made a conscious decision to
accord different treatment under the Sherman Act to the type of conduct in
this case.58 The Supreme Court noted that, “[u]nless we second-guess the
judgment of Congress . . . we can only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach”
of Section 1.59 From this, the Supreme Court concluded that a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with
each other in violation of the Sherman Act.60 The Supreme Court held that
for purposes of Section 1, a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are to
be considered a single entity, and thus immune from Section 1 liability.61
The Supreme Court came to its holding by reasoning that there was a
“complete unity of interest” between a parent and its wholly owned sub-

52. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
53. Id. at 755–58.
54. Id. at 758.
55. Id. at 767.
56. Id.
57. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
58. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775 (“[T]he Act’s plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made a purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct.”).
59. Id. at 776.
60. Id. at 777 (holding “that Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary Regal are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
61. Id. at 771.
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sidiary.62 Because of this “complete unity of interest,” the Supreme Court
reasoned that there could be no combination or agreement of the type that
joined parties who had previously maintained different interests.63 Since it
was this type of agreement that Section 1 sought to prevent, the Supreme
Court held that there was no justification for liability against a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary under Section 1.64
A. Copperweld Creates Uncertainty For Antitrust Defendants
While Copperweld is important for establishing a clear rule that a
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are to be considered a
single entity for purposes of Section 1,65 the decision has created significant
uncertainty in other contexts.66 In Copperweld, the Supreme Court failed
to set clear guidelines for what other types of relationships may be afforded
single entity status, causing defendants in antitrust litigation to argue for
application of the Copperweld single entity doctrine to other forms of business relationships.67 As the First Circuit noted in Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, L.L.C., “what the Supreme Court has never decided is how far
Copperweld applies to more complex entities and arrangements that involve a high degree of corporate and economic integration but less than
that existing in Copperweld itself.”68 As a result of the confusion about
what other types of business relationships may receive single entity treatment, some federal circuit courts have applied single entity status to certain
types of business relationships while other federal circuit courts have denied single entity treatment to the very same types of business relation62. Id.
63. Id. (stating that “[i]f a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of
action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served differed interests . . . .”).
64. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (reasoning that because a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary could not produce a “sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served
different interests . . . there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.”).
65. Id. at 776.
66. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[W]hat
the Supreme Court has never decided is how far Copperweld applies to more complex entities
and arrangements that involve a high degree of corporate and economic integration but less than
that existing in Copperweld itself.”); see also McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (stating that the
“Supreme Court did not set clear parameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and
antitrust defendants have cited Copperweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within
the single entity classification.”).
67. McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (stating that the “Supreme Court did not set clear parameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and antitrust defendants have cited Copperweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within the single entity classification.”).
68. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 56.
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ships.69 This is exactly what has happened in the application of the single
entity doctrine to sports leagues in the federal circuit courts.70 As explained below, the federal circuit courts are currently in direct conflict on
the issue of whether single entity status, and the immunity to the Sherman
Act it affords under Copperweld, extends to sports leagues.71
IV. COMPARE AND CONTRAST: THE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES AS A SINGLE ENTITY
A. The Majority Approach
The majority of federal circuit courts have rejected the notion that
sports leagues are a single entity under Copperweld.72 Consequently, they
have held that the individual teams are separate entities capable of conspiring with one another for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.73 The
Ninth Circuit articulated the reasoning behind this position in the seminal
case Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League.74 In this 1984 case, the NFL argued that the structure of its league
is similar to that of a joint venture and thus should be afforded single entity

69. Compare Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We
do not agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a
single enterprise for purposes of §1, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent
concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted), with Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated
as a single firm . . . .”).
70. Compare Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which found
a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of §1, applies
to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted),
with Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 598 (“We see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated
as a single firm . . . .”).
71. Keyte, supra note 21, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split between the Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of
which have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues . . . .”).
72. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “the courts have
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the singleentity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”).
73. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large part
distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which
found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of §1,
applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation
omitted).
74. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1381.
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status under Copperweld.75 In rejecting the NFL’s argument, the Ninth
Circuit found that each team acts as an individual entity, wholly distinct
from the NFL itself.76 In analyzing the structure of the league, the Ninth
Circuit first noted that each team was independently owned, and that each
team’s profits and losses were not shared, which is a characteristic that is
not common in the types of joint ventures and partnerships that are usually
given single entity status.77 Second, because profits and losses are not
shared, each NFL team is forced to compete with one another to secure
media coverage, fan support, sponsorship deals, television revenues, and
talented players and coaches.78
The First Circuit, in Sullivan v. National Football League, stated that
it was this exact type of competition between the NFL teams that removed
the league from consideration for single entity status under Copperweld.79
The First Circuit stated that this type of competition off of the field “tends
to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1.”80 Other circuits have denied single entity status to other
sports leagues as well, such as Major League Soccer,81 the Ontario Hockey
League,82 and a professional tennis league.83 In reviewing these holdings,
75. Id. at 1387 (stating that “[t]he NFL contends the league structure is in essence a single
entity, akin to a partnership or joint venture, precluding application of Sherman Act section 1
which prevents only contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”).
76. Id. at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large
part distinct from the NFL.”).
77. Id. at 1389–90 (reasoning that “although a large portion of League revenue, approximately 90%, is divided equally among the teams, profits and losses are not shared, a feature
common to partnerships or other ‘single entities.’”).
78. Id. at 1390 (“In addition to being independent business entities, the NFL clubs do
compete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and management
personnel. . . . [T]here is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio revenues, and media space.”).
79. Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We do not
agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single
enterprise for purposes of §1, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 48 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying
single entity status to Major League Soccer).
82. See Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d
462, 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[j]ust as the National Football League could not accurately be characterized as a ‘single economic entity,’ neither could the OHL, which exists only as
constituted by its twenty member teams”).
83. See Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71 (2nd
Cir. 1988) (holding that “[c]ourts have consistently held that, since joint ventures—including
sports leagues and other such associations—consist of multiple entities, they can violate §1 of the
Sherman Act”).
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the decision to reject single entity status for sports leagues seems to be
based on the distinct diversity in interests of each individual team, from independent ownership to competition for players, fans, and media coverage.84 These diverse interests are inconsistent with the “complete unity of
interest” element that Copperweld requires for single entity treatment.85
B. The Minority Approach
The Seventh Circuit has twice held that sports leagues can be considered a single entity under Copperweld, even though the majority of federal
circuit courts have held that sports leagues should not be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1.86 Other circuits, including the Fourth
and Fifth, have reached similar conclusions.87 These courts have noted that
Copperweld does not set a clear standard for how sports leagues should be
viewed in terms of the single entity doctrine,88 and believe that the question
should be answered “one league at a time–and perhaps one facet of a
league at a time.”89
The Seventh Circuit articulated this position in the seminal case Chi.
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, decided in 1996.90 The court first focused on the
fact that each team in the NBA, although independently and separately
owned, produces a single product that could not be produced without the
cooperation of all of the other teams.91 As the court famously noted, “a
league with one team would be like one hand clapping.”92 Under its “creation of a single product” viewpoint, the Seventh Circuit analogized the

84. See Keyte, supra note 21, at 49 (stating that in sports league cases it is not difficult “to
highlight facts about league structure, governance, and the characteristics of individual teams to
argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”).
85. See id.
86. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 6 (“The Seventh Circuit has now twice held that a
professional sports league can constitute a single entity even if its member teams are separately
owned.”).
87. Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 4 (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to agree
with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to fall
outside the scope of Section 1.”).
88. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir.
1996) (“These cases do not yield a clear principle about the proper characterization of sports
leagues–and we do not think that Copperweld imposes one ‘right’ characterization.”).
89. Id. (stating a need to ask “Copperweld’s functional question one league at a time—and
perhaps one facet of a league at a time”).
90. Id. at 593.
91. Id. at 598–99 (stating that the NBA “produces a single product; cooperation is essential”).
92. Id.
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NBA to an automaker.93 The Seventh Circuit stated that the NBA is “one
product from a single source even though the Chicago Bulls and Seattle
Supersonics are highly distinguishable, just as General Motors is a single
firm even though a Corvette differs from a Chevrolet.”94
In holding that the NBA could be considered a single entity under
Copperweld, the Seventh Circuit also relied on language from the Supreme
Court decision of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., which stated that “the clubs
that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent
economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for
economic survival” and that “circumstance[s] make[ ] the league more like
a single bargaining employer.”95 Other circuits have used this same reasoning in applying single entity status to soccer organizations and professional
golf associations.96 In holding that sports leagues can be considered a single entity under Section 1, these courts seem to focus their attention on the
necessity required of each team to work together to create the game itself,
which is in line with the complete unity of interest element required under
Copperweld.97
C. Why the Majority Approach is Better
Most commentators agree that the majority of federal circuit courts
have engaged in the proper approach of analysis in holding that sports
leagues should not be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1.98
Such commentators agree with the First99 and Ninth Circuits100 that sports
leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of “complete unity of interest” that is necessary to be afforded single entity treatment.101 In regards
93. Id. at 599.
94. Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 599.
95. Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248–49 (1996)).
96. Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 4 (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to agree
with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to fall
outside the scope of Section 1.”).
97. See Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
98. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “the courts have
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the singleentity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”).
99. See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994).
100. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389–
90 (9th Cir. 1984).
101. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 894 (arguing that “sports leagues lack sufficient unity
of interest for any court to classify them as ‘single entities’”).
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to a lack of “complete unity of interest,” many commentators focus on
league structure and governance, and the diverse interests of individual
teams.102 Consistent with the holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits,103
commentators specifically point to the competition among each league’s
member teams in areas such as ticket sales, player acquisition, corporate
sponsorships, and television, radio and merchandising revenues to support
their position.104
1. The Majority Approach is Consistent with the Original Meaning Behind
the Single Entity Doctrine
The Supreme Court should use the opportunity presented in American
Needle to firmly establish that sports leagues are not to be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1. The Supreme Court should follow the
reasoning used by the majority of federal circuit courts by rejecting the
NFL’s claim for single entity treatment because the majority approach’s
reasoning is consistent with the original meaning behind single entity status
established in Copperweld.105 To receive single entity status, Copperweld
requires a “complete unity of interest.”106 According to the Supreme Court
in Copperweld, the “complete unity of interest” between a parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiary was the exact type of coordinated behavior
Congress believed fell outside the Sherman Act’s scope.107 The Supreme
Court explained that the “complete unity of interest” between a parent
company and its wholly owned subsidiary could not form the type of
agreement covered by Section 1.108 The Supreme Court stated that, “if a
102. See Keyte, supra note 21, at 49 (stating that in sports league cases it is not difficult
“to highlight facts about league structure, governance, and the characteristics of individual teams
to argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”).
103. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which found a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 . . . applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each
team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”).
104. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these
leagues lack complete unity of interest in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts
(including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”).
105. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 776 (“Unless we second-guess the judgment of Congress to limit § 1 to concerted conduct, we can only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of that provision.”).
108. Id. at 771 (holding that “the very notion of an ‘agreement’ in Sherman Act terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning”).
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parent and wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of action, there
is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.”109
In an effort to stay true to the original purpose behind the creation of
the single entity doctrine, the Supreme Court must reject the NFL’s request
for single entity status in American Needle. As stated above,110 the majority of federal circuit courts and commentators agree there is little doubt that
sports leagues lack the “complete unity of interest” that is required under
Copperweld.111 Treatment of sports leagues as a single entity would thus
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for affording single entity status.112 With sports leagues, there are different interests among its
member teams, and there is justification for Section 1 scrutiny.113 As the
majority of federal circuit courts and commentators have pointed out, these
different interests can be seen in the fact that each NFL member team acts
as an individual entity, wholly distinct from the NFL itself.114 As a result,
each NFL team is forced to compete with one another to secure media coverage, fan support, sponsorship deals, television revenues, and talented

109. Id.
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large part
distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994)
(stating that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24, at
925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of
the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media
revenues.”).
112. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
113. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to
make each team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (stating
that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 925
(“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the
following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media
revenues.”).
114. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to
make each team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”); see also Sullivan, 34 F.3d at
1099 (stating that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams
pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24,
at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each
of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”).
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players and coaches.115 These different interests show a lack of “complete
unity of interest” between the NFL and its member teams and provide justification for rejecting single entity treatment. Therefore, if the Supreme
Court is to stay true to the original meaning behind the single entity doctrine, it must reject single entity treatment for sports leagues.
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in American Needle Was Limited to the
Narrow Context of Promoting Intellectual Property
The Supreme Court should reject the NFL’s request to extend the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in American Needle to all facets of sports leagues
because that holding was specifically limited to the particular facts of the
case.116 Noting that it had never “render[ed] a definitive opinion as to
whether the teams of a professional sports league can be considered a single entity”117 under Copperweld, the Seventh Circuit specifically limited its
review to “the actions of the NFL and its member teams as they pertain to
the teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property collectively via
NFL Properties.”118 For more than forty years, the NFL and its teams
“have promoted NFL Football by collectively licensing and marketing their
identifying trademarks for use on consumer products” such as hats and jerseys.119 These activities are carried out by NFL Properties, the teams’
jointly owned affiliate.120 In the narrow context of licensing its intellectual
property, the court found it significant that the NFL “competes with other
forms of entertainment for a[ ] [limited] audience” and emphasized that the
loss of that audience to other “forms of entertainment necessarily impacts
the individual teams’ success.”121 The court stated that “nothing in § 1
prohibits the NFL teams from cooperating so the league can compete
against other entertainment providers.”122 Because of these facts, the court
held that the NFL acted as a single entity in the limited context of promot115. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (“In addition to being independent business entities, the NFL clubs do compete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire
players, coaches, and management personnel. . . . [T]here is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio revenues, and media space.”).
116. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“Thus, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we will limit our review to . . . the actions of the
NFL and its member teams as they pertain to the teams’ agreement to license their intellectual
property collectively via NFL Properties.”).
117. Id. at 741.
118. Id. at 742.
119. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 1.
120. Id.
121. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 743.
122. Id. at 744.
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ing its intellectual property.123
While the NFL may act as a single entity when licensing its intellectual property, the Supreme Court must not forget that the NFL “teams may
assume different roles in different circumstances—with different consequences for antitrust enforcement.”124 Therefore, although the Supreme
Court could affirm the Seventh Circuit holding and allow an exception for
the NFL in instances when it is licensing its intellectual property, it must
still hold that sports leagues remain subject to Section 1 liability because its
member teams still compete with each other in areas such as ticket sales,
player acquisition, corporate sponsorships, and television, radio and merchandising revenues.125 Because the Seventh Circuit’s holding in American
Needle was limited to the particular facts in that case,126 the Supreme Court
should not extend its holding and afford single entity status to all facets of
sports leagues.
3. Rejecting the Minority Approach on Policy Grounds
The Supreme Court should also reject single entity status to sports
leagues on policy grounds. Since its enactment, the Sherman Act has been
used as a tool to protect consumers and small businesses from anticompetitive conduct.127 “The courts, Congress, and commentators . . . all [recognize] the importance to consumer welfare of antitrust constraints—or the
absence thereof—in the sports league context.”128 As the Second Circuit so
123. Id. (holding that “the NFL teams are best described as a single source of economic
power when promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property”).
124. Brief for the U.S., supra note 49, at 17 (citing Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.,
284 F.3d 47, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002)).
125. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these
leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”).
126. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 742 (“Thus, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we
will limit our review to . . . the actions of the NFL and its member teams as they pertain to the
teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property collectively via NFL Properties.”).
127. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses.”); Posting of Caleb Groos to FindLaw, DOJ Antitrust Enforcement to Return;
New Approach to Bundling and Predatory Pricing?,
http://blogs.findlaw.com/free_enterprise/2009/05/doj-antitrust-enforcement-to-return-newapproach-to-bundling-and-predatory-pricing.html (May 11, 2009, 12:34 EST) [hereinafter FindLaw] (stating that the “ultimate goal of antitrust laws [is] the protection of consumer welfare”).
128. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 9, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v.
Nat’l Football League, (U.S. June 8, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 1604441 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief]; see, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he welfare losses stemming from the potentially anticompetitive agreements among profes-
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aptly put it, to immunize the NFL from Section 1 scrutiny would be “[t]o
tolerate such a loophole [that] would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects.”129
The consequences of granting sports leagues Section 1 immunization
are numerous.130 For example, with Section 1 immunization, the NFL and
other sports leagues could: (1) reduce the competition for free agents in
sports leagues by restricting a player’s ability to move from one team to
another; (2) enforce a salary schedule which could restrict competition by
teams for prospective players, coaches, and management personnel; (3) further restrict control over team marketing, merchandising and broadcasting
rights; and (4) damage the negotiating ability of the player unions, likely
resulting in more player strikes or lock outs.131 By ruling against the NFL,
the Supreme Court will preserve the ability of small businesses to sue the
league on antitrust grounds.132 This will prevent many small businesses
from being completely shut out from doing business with the league.133
With price competition from small businesses,134 the NFL will not be able
to engage in exclusive commercial deals with the highest bidder,135 which
likely would have run small businesses into the ground and driven up
prices for fans.136
By refusing to grant single entity status to sports leagues, the Supreme
Court will preserve the ability of the federal circuit courts to regulate sports
leagues under Section 1.137 This will ensure that consumers are protected
from any anticompetitive conduct by sports leagues and their teams, consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.138 In sum, the Supreme Court
sional sports clubs have been well documented.”).
129. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
130. See infra Part IV.C.3.
131. Munson, supra note 4; see also Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
132. See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
133. See FindLaw, supra note 127 (“Enforcing our laws against anti-competitive behavior
could mean more room for small businesses to compete. . . . [A]ntirust enforcement will shift
business behavior in favor of competition open to more small businesses.”); see also Belson &
Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13; Belson, supra note 17, at B11.
134. See The Huffington Post, supra note 7.
135. See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13.
136. See id.
137. Edelman, supra note 24, at 926 (stating that “[b]y rejecting the notion that premier
American sports leagues are ‘single entities,’ federal courts importantly retain the ability to regulate premier American sports clubs under Section One of the Sherman Act.”).
138. Edelman, supra note 24, at 926–27 (arguing that by rejecting single entity status for
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should use the American Needle case to establish a rule that denies single
entity status to sports leagues.
V. A PRO-BUSINESS COURT IN ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE UNDER CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS
While it is usually not easy to predict how the Supreme Court will
rule in a particular case, sometimes a review of the Supreme Court’s political leanings and its recent decisions in a particular area of law can cast
some insight on the possible outcome. In reviewing the Supreme Court’s
most recent decisions under the guidance of Chief Justice Roberts, it is apparent that “since John Roberts was appointed chief justice in 2005, the
[Supreme] [C]ourt has seemed only more receptive to business concerns.”139 Under the Chief Justice’s leadership, forty percent of the cases
his Supreme Court (Roberts Court) granted certiorari to involved business
interests, up ten percent from the Rehnquist Court.140 The Roberts Court’s
recent pro-business trend has prompted Jeffrey Rosen, a professor of law at
George Washington University Law School, to jokingly refer to the Roberts Court as “Supreme Court Inc.”141
Consistent with this general pro-business trend, the emerging antitrust jurisprudence from the Roberts Court can also be characterized as
conservative, pro-business, and pro-defendant.142 This trend is evident by
the fact that the Roberts Court heard more antitrust cases in its first two
terms than it had in the five years prior under the Rehnquist Court.143 In
professional sports leagues, “American consumers remain protected against the risks of anticompetitive conduct within the professional sports industry.”); see also Supplemental Brief, supra
note 128, at 9 (“The courts, Congress, and commentators . . . all recognize[ ] the importance to
consumer welfare of antitrust constraints—or the absence thereof—in the sports league context.”).
139. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 40.
140. Id. at 38, 40 (stating that “[f]orty percent of the cases the court heard last term involved business interests, up from around 30 percent in recent years.”).
141. Id. at 38-39. See also Jeffrey Rosen, GW Law School Profile,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=1763 (“The Chicago Tribune named him one of
the 10 best magazine journalists in America and the L.A. Times called him, ‘the nation's most
widely read and influential legal commentator.’”).
142. Matthew Freimuth & Estee M. Konor, Sotomayor’s Approach To Antitrust, LAW360,
July 9, 2009,
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2619%5CSotomayors_Appr
oach_To_AntitrustLaw360_7.09.pdf. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium: Big Business and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929, 929 (2009).
143. See Rosen, supra note 139, at 40 (stating that “[w]hile the Rehnquist Court heard less
than one antitrust decision a year, on average, between 1988 and 2003, the Roberts Court has
heard seven in its first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corporate defen-
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each and every case, the Roberts Court ruled “in favor of the corporate defendants,” a telling foreshadowing of things to come in American Needle.144
A. Major Victories for Big Business Under the Roberts Court in the
Twombly and Iqbal Antitrust Decisions
The Roberts Court has gone to great lengths to protect big business in
antitrust lawsuits.145 In response to the growing number of antitrust cases
against big businesses in recent years, the Roberts Court in Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly had an opportunity to consider the appropriate pleading standard for a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.146 Since the 1957 Conley v. Gibson147 case, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been
interpreted as “requir[ing] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”148
Before Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) was considered to merely require liberal notice pleading, which could be seen as an effort by the courts to keep the
merits of the claim as the central focus of the litigation.149 The idea behind
this relaxed pleading standard was to ensure that each litigant had his day
in court.150 However, in a drastic shift from how Rule 8(a)(2) had been interpreted for fifty years after Conley, the Roberts Court, in an effort to
shield big businesses from expensive antitrust suits, used Twombly to reinterpret Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring a heightened fact pleading standard.151
The Roberts Court reasoned that:
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that dis-

dants.”).
144. Id. (stating that in regards to antirust cases, “the Roberts Court has heard seven in its
first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corporate defendants.”).
145. See infra Part V.A–B.
146. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007).
147. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
148. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
149. Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 514 (2002)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 556.
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covery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.152
In support of its new interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2), the Roberts Court
focused on the costs of antitrust litigation to defendants.153 The Roberts
Court noted that “[t]he costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the
increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties
into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can
construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”154 By recognizing that “some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before
a [recognizable] antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably
costly and protracted discovery phase,”155 the Roberts Court took a major
step towards protecting big businesses from antitrust suits in the federal
courts.
Following the Twombly decision, there was confusion in the lower
federal courts as to whether the heightened pleading standard set forth in
the case applied only to antitrust cases or to all federal cases.156 In 2009,
the Roberts Court used Ashcroft v. Iqbal to resolve this issue.157 Instead of
limiting the scope of Twombly to the narrow context of antitrust cases, the
Roberts Court instead decided to take the Twombly holding one step further.158 In Iqbal, the Roberts Court stated that the Twombly heightened
pleading standard applies for “all civil actions.”159 While Iqbal was not a
business case, it can be seen as another major victory for big business un152. Id.
153. See id. at 558 (“Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.”) (citation omitted).
154. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d
1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
155. Id. (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J. sitting by designation)).
156. See Yuri Mikulka, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Raising the Federal Pleading Standard for
Plaintiffs and Providing a New Defense Tool for Corporate Defendants, LAWUPDATES.COM,
Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.lawupdates.com/tips/entry/iashcroft_v._iqbal_i_raising_the_federal_pleading_standar
d_for_plaintiffs_a.
157. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute. This
argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.’ Our
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”) (internal citations omitted).
158. See Mikulka, supra note 156; Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
159. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
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der the Roberts Court.160 Democrat lawmaker Henry Johnson of Georgia
called the “decision an unexpected gift for the business community.”161
The Roberts Court’s holding in Iqbal makes it much more difficult for
plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss by defendants—usually big businesses—in all federal complaints, not just antitrust suits.162
B. Other Recent Antitrust Cases Under the Roberts Court
Twombly and Iqbal are not the only decisions by the Roberts Court
that limit antitrust enforcement and/or liability against defendants.163 In
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, the Roberts Court limited antitrust
law when securities regulations apply by holding that securities law precludes antitrust claims.164 The Roberts Court eliminated the price-squeeze
claim as an antitrust cause of action in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc’ns, Inc., by overturning a sixty-year-old precedent written by Judge
Learned Hand.165 In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., the Roberts Court overturned a plaintiff’s Sherman Act Section 2
monopolization claim.166 The Roberts Court overruled a sixty-year-old interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act in Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v.
160. See Kristina Peterson, US Dem Reps Craft Bill to Prevent Easily Dismissing Lawsuits, NASDAQ.COM, Oct. 27, 2009, http://nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-newsstory.aspx?storyid=200910271746dowjonesdjonline000543&title=us-dem-reps-craft-bill-toprevent-easily-dismissing-lawsuits.
161. Id.
162. Mikulka, supra note 156 (“[F]or plaintiffs lacking requisite facts to support a claim
at the outset, it will mean fewer opportunities for relief. This is good news for defendants looking
for some reprieve from the onslaught of civil litigation filed against corporations . . . .”).
163. See infra Part V.B.
164. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283–85 (2007) (“We believe
it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core of the marketing of new securities is at issue;
where securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible
from the forbidden; where the threat of antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could
seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would
threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets. . . . We therefore conclude that the securities laws are ‘clearly incompatible’ with the application of the antitrust laws
in this context.”).
165. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 n.3, 1123
(2009) (“Given developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, we find
our recent decisions in Trinko and Brooke Group more pertinent to the question before us. . . .
[W]e hold that the price-squeeze claims set forth in that complaint are not cognizable under the
Sherman Act.”).
166. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 326
(2007) (“[The plaintiff] has not satisfied the Brooke Group standard. Therefore, its predatorybidding theory of liability cannot support the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, we vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.”).
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Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., when it overturned a plaintiff’s price discrimination claim.167 In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Roberts Court held that no per
se liability exists for joint ventures that set prices.168 The Roberts Court
again overruled a sixty-year-old precedent in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., by holding that a “patent does not necessarily confer market
power upon the patentee.”169 In Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., the Roberts Court disregarded almost one hundred years of legal precedent, by holding that minimum resale price maintenance by businesses is no longer unlawful per se.170
An examination of the recent antitrust decisions by the Roberts Court
leads one to infer a pro-business, pro-defendant agenda.171 Not a single
case taken by the Roberts Court has expanded antitrust enforcement or liability.172 Rather, all of the cases mentioned above limited the scope of antitrust liability. Some did so by overturning long-standing precedents favoring plaintiffs, while others reversed jury verdicts or court of appeal
167. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 182, 185
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today, however, by adopting a novel, transaction-specific concept of competition, the Court eliminates that statutory protection in all but those rare situations in
which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two Volvo dealers at the same time. . . . For
decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the RobinsonPatman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to
its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice
Black's opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).”).
168. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006) (“We see no reason to treat Equilon
differently just because it chose to sell gasoline under two distinct brands at a single price. As a
single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices
of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at
a single, unified price. If Equilon's price unification policy is anticompetitive, then respondents
should have challenged it pursuant to the rule of reason. But it would be inconsistent with this
Court's antitrust precedents to condemn the internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture
as per se unlawful.”).
169. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38–39, 45–46 (2006) (“The presumption that a patent confers market power migrated from patent law to antitrust law in Int’l Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). . . . Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and
most economists have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market
power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power
in the tying product.”).
170. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 (2007)
(“In Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the Court established
the rule that it is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a manufacturer to
agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer's goods. . . . We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.”).
171. See supra Part V.A–B.
172. See supra Part V.A–B.
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decisions favoring plaintiffs.173 The current trend of the Roberts Court antitrust jurisprudence certainly favors the NFL in American Needle.
C. The Politics of Antitrust Law and the Roberts Court
1. The Politics of Antitrust Law
The Roberts Court’s recent pro-business trend in its antitrust jurisprudence should not come as a surprise. For the past twenty-five years, antitrust enforcement has been linked to the political leaning of the oval office.174 This political link is in accord with what Congress intended when
the Sherman Act was passed.175 Robert Pitofsky, a Georgetown Law professor and former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,176 has noted
that “an antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns into account
would be unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch with the
rough political consensus that has supported antitrust enforcement for almost a century.”177 With Democrat presidents, there has been an expansion
of antitrust law and a shift towards strong antitrust enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) against big businesses.178 With Republican presidents, there has
been a contraction of antitrust law and a reduction in antitrust enforcement
173. See supra Part V.A–B.
174. See infra Part V.C.1. See generally Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall St. J. L. Blog,
The Antitrust Revolution is Underway, But How Far Can It Go?,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/01/the-antitrust-revolution-is-underway-but-how-far-can-itgo/tab/article (Feb. 1, 2010, 9:39 EST) [hereinafter Antitrust Revolution] (stating that “antitrust
followers predicted that enforcement activities would start slowly ramping up” soon after President Barack Obama took office following the lax enforcement of the antitrust laws against anticompetitive corporate behavior during the eight years George W. Bush was president).
175. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1052 (1979).
176. Robert Pitofsky, Georgetown Law Full Time Faculty Biography,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=FullTime&ID=307
(“Professor Pitofsky has had a distinguished career in government and is especially known for his
work in the antitrust field. He has served as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission . . .
[and] is co-author of the text, Cases & Materials on Antitrust.”).
177. Pitofsky, supra note 175, at 1052.
178. See infra Part V.C.1. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
MICH. L. REV. 213, 250 (1985) (“Historically, liberals have been fairly successful in getting Congress to write liability-expanding antitrust statutes.”); Michael Catanzaro, The Antitrust Club: A
Weapon in Bill Clinton’s Hands, NAT’L REV., Sept. 25, 2000, at 24, 26 (stating that there is a
“hostility to successful businesses that animates the Clinton antitrust apparatus”); Antitrust Revolution, supra note 174 (stating that “President Obama began installing the top antitrust enforcers
in the land in the early months of 2009 . . . [a]fter eight years of lax enforcement” under President
George W. Bush).
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by the FTC and DOJ against big businesses.179
For example, in the late 1980s under Republican President Ronald
Reagan, the antitrust division of the FTC had mounted “about as minimal
an antitrust program as can be imagined.”180 Under President Reagan and
fellow Republican President George H. W. Bush, the antitrust division of
the DOJ filed only three cases regarding the conduct of monopolies.181 In
contrast, President William J. Clinton, the Democrat successor to George
H. W. Bush, took an extremely different approach to antitrust enforcement.182 President Clinton’s antitrust regime was “hyperactive, politicized
and regulatory.”183 From 1994 to 1999, President Clinton’s “antitrust division filed a total of 481 cases, vastly increased its investigations of supposed monopolies, and intensified reviews of mergers and acquisitions.”184
President George W. Bush, the Republican successor to President Clinton,
subsequently contracted the expansive antitrust enforcement approach of
the Clinton administration and reverted to the minimal enforcement of antitrust that was seen under Republican Presidents Reagan and George H. W.
Bush.185 Under President George W. Bush, the DOJ did not pursue a single
anti-monopoly case and his administration installed high hurdles for enforcement against anticompetitive conduct.186 However, in May 2009, under the guidance of President George W. Bush’s Democrat successor President Barack Obama, the DOJ announced that it would return to the “more
strict enforcement of federal antitrust laws” seen in the Clinton administration.187 True to its word, in January 2010, the DOJ announced that the
Obama administration had directed it to “review the legality of the controversial Bowl Championship Series” and determine if it “potentially runs
afoul of the nation’s antitrust laws.”188

179. See infra Part V.C.1. See Hovenkamp, supra note 178, at 250 (“Leaders in conservative administrations have asked for legislation weakening the [antitrust] laws . . . .”). See also
Antitrust Revolution, supra note 174 (stating that there was lax enforcement of the antitrust laws
against anticompetitive corporate behavior during the eight years George W. Bush was president).
180. Catanzaro, supra note 178, at 24, 26 (quoting Robert Pitofsky).
181. Id. at 26.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id. at 26.
185. See FindLaw, supra note 127.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Justice Dept.: Obama Administration May Take Action on BCS,
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/01/29/obama.bcs.ap/index.html.
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2. The Politics of the Roberts Court Justices
When one considers the fact that the current Roberts Court is composed of more conservative, pro-business justices such as Roberts, Alito,
Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia, it should come as no surprise that the Roberts Court held for the corporate defendants in each of its recent antitrust
decisions.189 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
recently wrote an article discussing the connection between the political
ideologies of the Supreme Court justices and their voting records.190 The
article, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, used “a database
that include[d] the political background and voting records of the past 70
years of Supreme Court justices—who appointed each justice and how the
justices decided every case—to come up with a ranking, from most conservative to least conservative, of the 43 justices who have served on the court
since 1937.”191 Unsurprisingly, the study revealed that over the past 70
years, Republican-appointed justices had a tendency to vote conservatively,
while Democrat-appointed justices had a tendency to vote liberally.192 Republican presidents appointed seven of the nine Supreme Court justices that
were on the Roberts Court during its recent pro-business antitrust jurisprudence.193 According to Judge Posner’s study, Justices Thomas, Scalia,
Roberts, and Alito are “[f]our of the five most conservative justices to serve
on the Supreme Court” since 1937.194 The study also ranked Republican
appointee and current justice on the Roberts Court, Anthony Kennedy, as
the tenth most conservative Supreme Court justice since 1937.195 Former
President George W. Bush’s appointments of the Chief Justice and Justice
Alito to the Supreme Court may turn out to be his most long lasting legacy,
as they have shifted the Supreme Court in a more conservative direction.196
This shift favors the NFL in American Needle.
189. Rosen, supra note 139, at 40 (stating that in regards to antitrust cases, “the Roberts
Court has heard seven in its first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corporate defendants.”); see also Munson, supra note 4.
190. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009).
191. Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices: Four of the Five Most
Conservative Justices Since 1937 are on the Bench Today, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12,
2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/12/ranking-the-politics-ofsupreme-court-justices.html; Landes & Posner, supra note 190.
192. Ewers, supra note 191.
193. Id.
194. Id.; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 190.
195. See Landes & Posner, supra note 190.
196. Nina Totenberg, A Changed Court Faces Key Decisions In New Term, NPR.COM,
Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113438661.
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D. The NFL: Asking for Single Entity Treatment in the Right Place at the
Right Time
For decades, the NFL has unsuccessfully sought antitrust immunity
under Copperweld in the federal circuit courts.197 As explained above,198
the majority of federal circuit courts have rejected the NFL’s previous attempts for single entity treatment under Section 1199 because its individual
member “teams compete with each other for free-agent players, for
coaches, for executives, for sponsors, for naming rights money and for
fans.”200 However, with the Roberts Court obvious pro-business trend in
its most recent antitrust jurisprudence, the NFL might finally be presenting
its argument for single entity treatment under Copperweld “in the right
place at the right time.”201
The NFL is “one of America’s most profitable collection of businesses,” with combined team revenues in 2008 of over $6.5 billion.202 The
NFL’s individual member team revenues in 2007 ranged from $195 million
to over $300 million per year.203 Many of the NFL franchises are “now
valued at over $700 million per year.”204 With this in mind, the NFL is
hoping that the conservative, pro-business and pro-defendant trend of the
Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust jurisprudence continues in American
Needle.
1. The NFL’s Use of the Twombly Holding in American Needle
In Twombly, the Roberts Court focused its analysis on “[t]he costs of
modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal
courts.”205 In an effort to appeal to the Roberts Court’s position against
costly antitrust litigation that it announced in Twombly, the sports leagues
197. Munson, supra note 4.
198. See supra Part V.A–C.
199. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “[t]he courts have
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the singleentity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”).
200. Munson, supra note 4.
201. Id.
202. Edelman, supra note 24, at 891.
203. See Special Report: NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 10, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/30/sportsmoney_nfl08_NFL-Team-Valuations_Revenue.html.
204. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 891.
205. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.1984).
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argue that the answer to the question of whether they function “as a single
entity for purposes of Section 1 is a threshold issue that can bring otherwise
costly and burdensome antitrust litigation to an early end.”206 The NFL argues that the “application of Copperweld to professional sports leagues is a
frequently recurring issue”207 that “result[s] in years of litigation and enormous burden and expense.”208 The sports leagues maintain that the inconsistent application of Copperweld caused by the current federal circuit
court split “forces the league[s] to operate under a cloud of uncertainty as
to whether its most basic collective actions will, depending on [which circuit is] chosen by an antitrust plaintiff, subject it to a ruling that its member
teams have ‘conspired’ in violation of Section 1.”209
For the NFL and other sports leagues, this “uncertainty chills collaboration and decision-making, and it inevitably decreases interbrand
competition.”210 The chilling effect on collaboration and decision-making
caused by the current federal circuit court split is especially costly to sports
leagues because it is the very [type of] “conduct [that] the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.”211 The leagues contend that a uniform standard “finding that a professional sports league is a single entity whose collective activities fall outside the scope of Section 1”212 would allow “for potential
early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial
economy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and
other litigation burdens.”213 The NFL’s argument is consistent with the
206. Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6–7.
207. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 10–11 (“The experience of the NFL is not unusual among professional sports leagues; nor has the cascade of antitrust suits against them
abated. Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, NASCAR, and the ATP Tour each
is currently defending, or has recently defended, Section 1 antitrust suits challenging its decisions
about how to produce its integrated entertainment product.”).
208. Id. at 13.
209. Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6.
210. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 9; see also Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6
(“Mindful of that ever-present threat, the league is therefore unfairly limited and constrained in its
ability to develop business strategies that might enable it to compete more effectively in the larger
entertainment marketplace.”).
211. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 9 (arguing that under Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., “mistaken standards that permit inference of conspiracy when none should
be found ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect.’” 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
212. Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 8.
213. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13. See Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7
(stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case was consistent with the goals announced
by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it emphasized that deficiencies in a case
‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court.’” 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
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goals announced in Twombly and is sure to appeal to the Roberts Court in
American Needle.214
2. The NFL’s Twombly Argument Is Inconsistent with the Approach Used
By the Seventh Circuit
While the NFL’s appeal to the Roberts Court for a uniform standard
based on preventing costly antitrust litigation may be consistent with the
goals announced in Twombly,215 it is inconsistent with the analysis used by
the Seventh Circuit that led it to grant the NFL single-entity status in the
first place.216 The Seventh Circuit held in American Needle that “whether a
professional sports league is a single entity should be addressed not only
‘one league at a time,’ but also ‘one facet of a league at a time.’”217 It was
specifically because of this more searching inquiry into a specific “facet of
a league” that the Seventh Circuit held that in the specific facet of “promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property,” “the
NFL teams are best described as a single” entity.218 Therefore, rather than
offering the potential for early resolution of antitrust challenges that the
NFL seeks in its appeal to the Roberts Court,219 the Seventh Circuit’s approach to single entity analysis actually “appears to require more factual
214. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13 (arguing that a uniform standard would allow
“for potential early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial economy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and other litigation burdens.”); see
Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7 (stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case
was consistent with the goals announced by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it
emphasized that deficiencies in a case ‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of
time and money by the parties and the court.’” 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
215. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13 (arguing that a uniform standard would allow
“for potential early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial economy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and other litigation burdens.”); see
Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7 (stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case
was consistent with the goals announced by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it
emphasized that deficiencies in a case ‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of
time and money by the parties and the court.’” 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
216. See infra Part V.D.2.
217. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996)).
218. Id. at 744.
219. Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 5–6 (“This case presents an appropriate opportunity to resolve this recurring circuit dispute, to provide further guidance on the principles recently
articulated by this court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006), and to permit resolution,
early in the litigation, of Section 1 antitrust challenges to the decisionmaking of highly integrated
joint ventures.”).
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analysis than that normally needed under the Supreme Court’s single entity
analysis in Copperweld.”220
Under the traditional Copperweld analysis, the NFL could simply “offer evidence of [its] corporate structure and that, by itself, is sufficient to
permit the court to find” for or against affording single entity status.221
This simple corporate structure analysis reduces litigation costs by
“limit[ing] the range of discovery relevant to a motion for summary judgment based on Copperweld.”222 In contrast to the simple corporate structure arguments that are sufficient in the traditional Copperweld analysis,
“[u]nder the Seventh Circuit’s ‘fact intensive’ look at ‘one facet of a league
at a time,’ the courts will need to look at more than just corporate structure,
with the Seventh Circuit [asking for] . . . an inquiry . . . into the market and
competition questions that courts typically bypass” under the traditional
Copperweld analysis.223 The inquiry into the market and competition that
the Seventh Circuit approach demands is more costly than the traditional
approach because “more discovery would be relevant and expected.”224
Therefore, while the Seventh Circuit approach may be costlier to the NFL,
it is the only approach that has led to single entity treatment for the NFL.
Thus, by asking the Roberts Court to make a ruling in American Needle
based on limiting antitrust costs, the NFL is asking the Court to invalidate
the only approach that has ever afforded the league single entity status.
VI. THE EFFECT THAT A DEMOCRAT PRESIDENT AND HIS SUPREME
COURT APPOINTEE WILL HAVE ON THE ROBERTS COURT’S ANTITRUST
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN NEEDLE
American Needle will be the first antitrust case heard during Roberts’ tenure as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with a Democratic president in the White House.225 Unlike his predecessor, President Obama has
already announced his willingness to resume the vigorous approach to antitrust enforcement that was seen under the Clinton Administration.226 While
it seems apparent that the Roberts Court does not share President Obama’s
position on antirust enforcement,227 in August 2009, President Obama took
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (emphasis added).
Id. at 371 n.45.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371 n.45.
See supra Part V.
FindLaw, supra note 127.
See supra Part V.A–C.
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the first step in potentially halting the Roberts Court’s recent pro-business,
pro-defendant antitrust jurisprudence by appointing Sonia Sotomayor, a
liberal justice, to replace Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court.228
A. Justice Sotomayor’s Impact on the Roberts Court’s Future Antitrust
Jurisprudence
While Justice Sotomayor’s appointment will not alter the Roberts
Court’s ideological makeup, she is replacing a liberal justice that tended to
vote with the conservative majority on antitrust issues.229 Although Justice
Souter has often been considered a reliable liberal vote, his antitrust jurisprudence has been conservative under the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts.230 Justice Souter wrote the Twombly decision and voted with the conservative majority in Credit Suisse Securities, Weyerhaeuser, Volvo Trucks,
Dagher, and Illinois Tool Works231—all cases that limited the scope of antitrust liability by either overturning long-standing precedents favoring plaintiffs, or by reversing jury verdicts or court of appeal decisions favoring
plaintiffs.232
Also of particular note is the fact that Justice Thomas dissented in
Credit Suisse233 and Volvo Trucks,234 showing that he will not always vote
with the conservative majority of the Roberts Court on antitrust issues.
Therefore, while at first glance it may seem that Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of a liberal justice will do little to alter the Roberts Court’s recent antitrust jurisprudence, Justice Souter’s and Justice Thomas’s antitrust
voting records under the guidance of Chief Justice Roberts make it clear
that Justice Sotomayor’s vote may have a much greater impact in close antitrust decisions than originally anticipated.
B. Justice Sotomayor Is Likely to Adopt the Majority Approach in
228. The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
229. Freimuth & Konor, supra note 142 (stating that Sotomayor’s “appointment will not
alter the court’s ideological makeup.”).
230. David G. Savage, A Man of Tradition, and Suprises, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at
A12 (stating that Justice Souter is a “liberal on the court today.”).
231. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546
U.S. 164 (2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink,
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
232. See supra Part V.A–B.
233. See, e.g., Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234. See, e.g., Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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American Needle Based on Her Second Circuit Antitrust Jurisprudence
While it remains to be seen what effect Justice Sotomayor will have
on the current pro-business trend of the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence in American Needle,235 a review of her decisions on the Second Circuit shows a familiarity with antitrust law,236 and suggests that she may be
a justice that is willing to disagree with the current antitrust jurisprudence
of the Roberts Court.237 To the extent that the Roberts Court displays a
pro-business agenda in its antitrust jurisprudence, Justice “Sotomayor’s
prior [antitrust] decisions show no indication that she will necessarily fit
that mold.”238 Justice Sotomayor’s past antitrust decisions reveal a “highly
fact-specific approach to antitrust matters and an awareness of the legislative intent and policies underlying the federal antitrust laws.”239 Justice Sotomayor’s Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence suggests that she favors
the party whose position is consistent with the legislative intent underlying
the antitrust statutes.240
While the impact of Justice Sotomayor’s vote in American Needle is
uncertain,241 her Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence reveals that she will
likely follow the reasoning used by the majority of federal circuit courts
and reject the NFL’s claim for single entity treatment in American Needle.242 As stated above,243 the majority of federal circuit courts and commentators agree that there is little doubt that sports leagues lack the com235. Freimuth & Konor, supra note 142 (stating that American Needle “will be the new
Justice Sotomayor’s first opportunity to weigh in on an antitrust matter from the Supreme Court
and will provide antitrust practitioners with a more concrete sense of whether she will bring about
any significant impact on the Roberts court’s emerging antitrust jurisprudence.”).
236. Id. (stating that Justice Sotomayor’s Second Circuit antitrust “decisions demonstrate
a highly fact specific approach to antitrust matters and an awareness of the legislative intent and
policies underlying the federal antitrust laws.”).
237. See id. (“However, to the extent the current court demonstrates a pro-defendant, probusiness ideological bias in antitrust matters, [Justice] Sotomayor’s prior decisions show no indication that she will necessarily fit that mold.”).
238. Id.
239. Id.; see Innomed Labs, LLC v. ALZA Corp., 368 F.3d 148, 159-61 (2d Cir. 2004)
(using a detailed analysis of the Robinson-Patman Act’s legislative history to find that Congress
had intended the Act “to apply to all commodities distribution contracts, in all positions in the
distribution chain.”).
240. Freimuth & Konor, supra note 142 (stating that for Sotomayor, “legislative intent
and policy are of paramount concern in addressing the scope and applicability of federal antitrust
laws.”).
241. Id. (“Thus, to a large extent, the impact of [Sotomayor’s] assumed appointment on
the Roberts court’s antitrust jurisprudence is uncertain.”).
242. See infra Part VI.B.
243. See supra Part IV.A.C.

508

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:477

plete unity of interest required under Copperweld.244 Treatment of sports
leagues as a single entity in American Needle would then be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for affording single entity status.
Since the reasoning of the majority approach is consistent with the original
meaning behind the single entity doctrine established in Copperweld, Justice Sotomayor is likely to find that the different interests among the member teams provide justification for Section 1 scrutiny of sports leagues.
Therefore, consistent with her adherence to legislative intent in antitrust
cases while on the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor will likely reject the
NFL’s request for single entity status in American Needle.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the current split that exists in the federal circuit courts of appeal on the issue of whether a sports league should be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
approach taken by the majority of federal circuit courts is preferable because sports leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of complete
“unity of interest” that is necessary for single entity treatment.245 The Roberts Court should adopt the majority approach because the approach recognizes the diverse interests of individual teams,246 “the importance to consumer welfare of antitrust constraints” on sports leagues,247 and is
consistent with the original meaning behind the single entity doctrine.248
While it seems logical that the Roberts Court would adopt the approach favored by most commentators and the majority of federal circuit
courts, a review of the Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust jurisprudence
makes that outcome unlikely.249 Not a single case taken by the Roberts
Court has expanded antitrust enforcement or liability.250 Rather, all of the
cases have limited the scope of antitrust liability by either overturning long244. See also Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these
leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”).
245. See id. at 894 (arguing that “sports leagues lack sufficient unity of interest for any
court to classify them as ‘single entities.’”).
246. See Keyte, supra note 21, at 49 (stating that in sports league cases it is not difficult
“to highlight facts about league structure, governance, and the characteristics of individual teams
to argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”).
247. Supplemental Brief, supra note 128, at 9.
248. See supra Part IV.C.1.
249. See supra Part V.A–C.
250. See supra Part V.A–B.
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standing precedents favoring plaintiffs or by reversing jury verdicts or
court of appeal decisions favoring plaintiffs.251 Therefore, despite the fact
that logic would point to the majority approach being adopted, the current
pro-business, pro-defendant trend of the Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust jurisprudence is likely to continue in American Needle, with a ruling
in favor of the NFL.
Matt Carter*

251. See supra Part V.A–B.
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** The United States Supreme Court decided American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League
on May 24, 2010, holding that the National Football League is not a single entity for purposes of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court agreed with the author and the majority of federal circuit courts that sports leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of complete “unity of interest” that is necessary for single entity treatment. The Court’s holding is a clear departure from
the pro-business, pro-defendant trend of its most recent antitrust jurisprudence. However,
whether American Needle signifies the end to the Roberts Court’s pro-business antitrust jurisprudence, or is simply an aberration, is yet to be seen.

